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Abstract
This study examines the performance of the policy of communitymanagement for rural groundwater
supply inAfrica. Across the continent, policies that promote communitymanagement have dominated
the rural water supply sector for decades.As a result, hundreds of thousands of village-level committees
have been formed tomanage community boreholes equippedwithhandpumps.With a signiﬁcant
proportionof these handpumpsnon-functional at any one time, increasing effort is targeted toward
understanding the interacting social andphysical determinants of this ‘hidden crisis’.We conducted a
survey of communitymanagement arrangements across six hundred sites in rural Ethiopia,Malawi, and
Uganda, examining the extent towhichmanagement capacity is related to borehole functionalitywhilst
accounting for a range of contextual variables. The capacity ofwatermanagement arrangements
(WMAs)was assessed according to four dimensions:ﬁnance system; affordablemaintenance and repair;
decisionmaking, rules, and leadership; and external support. The survey reveals that 73.3%ofWMAs
havemediumorhigh capacity.However, we foundno strong relationship between the capacity of the
WMAand the functionality of the borehole.Of the fourmanagement dimensions, affordable
maintenance and repairwas the best predictor of borehole functionality.However, the capacity of this
dimensionwas seen to be the lowest overall, with 61.9%of sitesweakornon-existent.Our results
provide very limited support for the policy of communitymanagement, andwe suggest that evidence
alone has not accounted for its persistence over decades. After a short historical analysis, we conclude
that explanation for the endurance of thismodel canbe found in the nexus between evidence, ideology,
andpolicy.We argue that it is this samenexus thatwill likely ensure the popularity of community
management for some time to come, despite new ideas and evidence to the contrary.
1. Introduction
Ensuring universal access to a safe and sustainable
supply of water is a key development challenge. Meet-
ing this challenge brings a raft of beneﬁts including
improved health, nutrition, time saving, and educa-
tion (Hunter et al 2010). The international commu-
nity’s commitment to achieving these beneﬁts is
enshrined in Goal 6 of the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). Here Target 6.1 aims, ‘by
2030, [to] achieve universal and equitable access to safe
and affordable drinking water for all’ (UNGA A/RES/
70/1 2015:16). Nowhere is this commitment more
necessary than in Sub-SaharanAfrica (SSA)7.
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Between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of the population in SSA
using an improved drinking water source rose from 48% to 68% but
MDG Target 7c was not achieved. This differs from the picture
globally, which rose from 76% to 91% and where Target 7c was
achieved in 2010,ﬁve years ahead of schedule (UN2015b).
© 2019TheAuthor(s). Published by IOPPublishing Ltd
Since the 1980s—the ﬁrst UN ‘Water Decade’—
Community Based Management (CBM) has been the
policy prescription par excellence for operationalising
participatory development in the rural water supply
sector (Sara and Katz 1997, Black 1998, Lockwood and
Smits 2011). The cornerstone of the CBMmodel is the
creation of a local water point committee or similar
community organisation, which is charged with the
operation andmaintenance of the borehole8.
There is a growing recognition among develop-
ment practitioners and academics that CBM of rural
water supply has struggled to deliver on many of its
promises (Mansuri and Rao 2004, Lockwood and
Smits 2011, Chowns 2015, van den Broek and Brown
2015). Critical literature has pointed to the strong
ideological pull of CBM as a way to explain its ongoing
popularity as a policy model (Mosse 1999, Cornwall
and Brock 2005, Blaikie 2006). At the same time, there
is still a relative lack of evidence on how the manage-
ment capacity of communities relates to the function-
ality of their boreholes. Yet such evidence is crucial for
understanding how CBM actually works and for
informing future decision making on measures to
ensure the sustainable management and appropriate
design of groundwater supply infrastructure.
Acknowledging the need for better evidence
regarding the performance of CBM of groundwater,
there have been several recent attempts to understand
the ‘socio-technical interface’ (Whaley and Cleaver
2017); that is, the relationship between the community
management arrangement and the physical water
point. Whilst a growing number of studies are con-
cerned with this relationship (Stawicki 2012, Fos-
ter 2013, Welle and Williams 2014, Fisher et al 2015),
many of them base their approach upon normative
assumptions about the social and physical dimensions
of rural water supply thatmaymisrepresent real-world
situations in important ways.
One common assumption is that a formal water-
point committee, with a constitution, rules, tariffs, and
deﬁned roles is needed to ensure effective borehole
management. It has been argued that this assumption
is ﬂawed (Cleaver 2002, 2012, Ducrot 2017, Whaley
and Cleaver 2017). A focus only on the functioning of a
water point committee disregards the many ways in
which communities actually manage their boreholes.
Examples include the involvement of only one or a few
individuals; informal rotations of responsibility; sav-
ings clubs and burial associations; existing village gov-
ernment structures; schools and clinics; and different
forms of public-private partnership.
We therefore make a conceptual distinction
between the formal water point committee and the
WMA that exists in practice. Whilst the WMA will
include a water point committee if one is in operation,
it typically also encompasses individuals and groups
from wider village life. In this article, we examine the
capacity of WMAs for six hundred boreholes in rural
Ethiopia, Malawi, and Uganda and relate this to bore-
hole functionality. The paper sets out to answer the
following question:
Does increased understanding of the relationship
between water management capacity and borehole
functionality lend support to the policy of CBM for
sustainable groundwater supply?
In answering this question, we focus on which of
four WMA dimensions—ﬁnance system; affordable
maintenance and repair; decision making, rules, and
leadership; external support—are most important for
understanding the functionality of boreholes. We also
account for other key factors, including hydrogeology,
climate, poverty, borehole age, handpump type, size of
user community, and presence of alternative water
sources. Our ﬁndings lead us to reﬂect on the political
history of CBM, which we outline in the next section.
In concluding, we draw attention to the nexus between
evidence, ideology, and policy as a way of under-
standing the ongoing success of CBM as a develop-
mentmodel.
2. A political history of CBM
Policies for community management of groundwater
have been shaped by very different schools of develop-
ment thought. In the 1970s, people’s participation was
a central principle of the radical people-centred
approaches emanating from Latin America and else-
where (Freire 1996, Mohan and Stokke 2000). Such
ideas catalysed rights–based policy approaches, as
expressed in the inﬂuential Alma-Ata Declaration on
Primary Health Care whereby ‘[t]he people have the
right and duty to participate individually and collec-
tively in the planning and implementation of their
health care’ (WHO 1978:1), including ‘an adequate
supply of safe water’ (ibid: 2). This vision was to
inﬂuence the efforts made during the UN Water
Decade to deliver rural water supply through commu-
nity initiatives such as Village Level Operation and
Maintenance (Colin 1999).
For many countries in Africa, the 1970s and early
1980s were also an era of ‘high modern’ development
planning in which the community was seen as the low-
est level in national systems of water management
(Chauhan 1983, Dangerﬁeld 1983, Mtisi and Nicol
2003). Such initiatives were commonly supported by
large donor agencies (Therkildsen 1988) through pro-
grammes of project support; often mobilising idea-
lised notions of ‘community’ (Blaikie 2006, Harvey
and Reed 2007, Hall et al 2014). Despite such support,
many countries struggled with capacity. Poor service
delivery by government institutions further increased
the appeal of community management to policy
8
In this paper, we focus speciﬁcally on community boreholes
equipped with handpumps. For the sake of brevity, we will refer to
these as ‘boreholes’ or ‘community boreholes’ throughout.
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makers and donors (Sara and Katz 1997, Black 1998,
Harvey andReed 2007).
In the 1980s and 1990s the struggling economies of
many African countries were radically overhauled
through the Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs) imposed on them by the IMF and World Bank
(Ake 1996, Harvey 2005, Ferguson 2006). A central
pillar of the neoliberal-inspired SAPs was the ‘rolling
back’ of the state, including cuts to public expenditure
and social welfare, and a changed role for government
from service provider to service facilitator (Cleaver
and Elson 1995, Ake 1996, Ferguson 2006). Govern-
ment employees—mechanics and maintenance teams
—that had supported the community in water man-
agement were ‘retrenched’ and local people were
required to take on ‘ownership’, to operate and main-
tain their water points, or to contract private providers
to do so.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the participatory
agenda was given added momentum by interna-
tional conferences on water (Nicol et al 2012). Con-
ference statements gave varying emphases to
increasing equity and the role of users in water man-
agement (the 1990 New Delhi Statement), and to
treating water as an economic good (the 1992
‘Dublin Principles’). The 1992 ‘Earth Summit’ in
Rio de Janeiro further reinforced the desirability of
localism and participation in environmental man-
agement and ushered in a wave of decentralisation
reforms globally. Added intellectual backing was
given by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues (Feeny
et al 1990, Ostrom 1990, Baland and Platteau 1996),
who provided historical evidence and theoretical
insights into successful cases of community natural
resourcemanagement.
By the late 1990s, community management was
ﬁrmly established in the rural water sector and is now
central to many countries’ attempts to achieve the
SDGs. The endurance of CBM can be partly attrib-
uted to its appeal to the ideologies of both neoliberal-
ism and, to a lesser extent, people-centred
approaches of the Left. An example is the con-
temporary Demand Responsive Approach (in which
water users make key decisions about the services
they want and are able to pay for); apparently com-
bining ﬁnancial sustainability with choice. Our
research was designed to investigate whether these
policy assumptions about CBM translate into bore-
hole functionality.
3.Methodology
We use a unique interdisciplinary dataset on the
functionality of community boreholes and theirWMA,
collected in rural Ethiopia, Malawi, and Uganda. The
research constitutes the ﬁrst major survey phase of the
NERC/DFID/ESRC funded project entitled Hidden
Crisis: Unravelling Current Failures for Future Success
in Rural Groundwater Supply (https://upgro.org/
consortium/hidden-crisis2/). Six hundred sites9 were
selected across the three project countries using a
stratiﬁed two-stage random sampling technique based
on climate, hydrogeology, and poverty data (see SM1 is
available online at stacks.iop.org/ERL/14/085013/
mmedia). Fieldwork in each project country lasted
three months, with the teams visiting on average three
sites per day. The survey was staggered across the
project countries to coincide with their respective dry
seasons. Lead social scientists from the University of
Shefﬁeld provided ethical oversight, with the ﬁeldwork
teams conforming to the relevant ethical requirements
of the research institutions in each country. The
development NGOWaterAid ensured ethical access to
study communities in the ﬁeld, including sensitisation
andmobilisation activities.
3.1. Physical survey design
The physical science component of the survey col-
lectedﬁeld data in order to develop a suite of indicators
of borehole functionality (Wilson et al 2016). The
survey method was based on a nuanced deﬁnition of
borehole functionality, which captures different tiers
of functionality from a simple binary ‘yes/no’ work-
ing, to capturing the level of functionality performance
and reliability (Bonsor et al 2018). Six functionality
categories addressing water quantity and borehole
reliability have been developed. These categories are
‘fully functioning’, ‘good yield, unreliable’, ‘poor
yield’, ‘poor yield, unreliable’, ‘no ﬂow but worked in
last year’, and ‘abandoned’. The borehole functionality
data collected from the survey are reported in Kebede
et al (2017), Mwathunga et al (2017) and Owor et al
(2017) (see SM2 for the physical survey template).
3.2. Social survey design
The social survey design consists of three parts.
Sections 1 and 2 capture general information about
the user community, user perceptions of the perfor-
mance of the community borehole (in terms of water
quantity and quality, reliability, and use), and the
availability of alternative water sources. Section 3
assesses the functionality of the WMA according to
four broad dimensions: (1) ﬁnance system, (2) afford-
able maintenance and repair, (3) decision making,
rules and leadership, and (4) external support10. A set
of twenty-three questions assess the four WMA
dimensions using a three-point scale. The deﬁnition of
a functioning WMA was developed from a literature
review and team discussions (see Whaley and
Cleaver 2017).
9
A site is deﬁned as a borehole and its user community, where the
user community constitutes either all or a part of the population of a
village.
10
In the remainder of the article we abbreviate these four WMA
dimensions as: (1) ﬁnance system, (2) affordable M&R, (3) decision
making, and (4) external support.
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At each site, the survey was conducted with a
group of eight to twelve community members com-
prising amix of water users (usually women) and indi-
viduals involved in water management. The physical
and social survey were piloted together in one district
inMalawi and revised accordingly before ﬁnalising the
survey template (see SM 3 for the social survey tem-
plate and further information on survey design and
implementation).
3.3.Data analysis
We explored the socio-technical interface (ﬁgure 1) by
analysing the relationship between the physical func-
tionality of community boreholes and the capacity of
their related WMA. The analysis was conducted in
three parts: investigating WMA capacity; the relation-
ship between WMA capacity and functionality; and
the inﬂuence of external factors onWMAcapacity.
In the ﬁnal dataset the four WMA dimensions
(ﬁnance system; affordable maintenance and repair;
decision making, rules, and leadership; and external
support) were weighed equally to produce the WMA
score, thus giving no one WMA dimension priory.
Abandoned sites were excluded from the analysis due
to the absence of active WMAs. In addition, questions
were removed if the community reported having no
experience of dealing with that particular aspect of a
WMA. WMAs were placed into one of four capacity
categories in accordance with their score: non-existent
(<50%), weak (50%–67%), functional (67%–84%),
and highly functional (>84%). As we employed a
three-point scale to assess WMA functionality, the
lowest possible WMA score is 33% (a score of one for
each answer) and the highest is 100%.
Further exploratory and statistical analysis were
then conducted on the dataset. We used box plots, the
Wilcoxon non-parametric test and correlation matri-
ces to examine the relationship between WMA capa-
city, borehole functionality, and borehole downtime.
To simplify the analysis we used functionality as a bin-
ary outcome (i.e. the fully functional category versus
the four remaining categories shown in ﬁgure 1).
Downtime was also divided into a binary outcome (i.e.
greater or less than 100 d).
We used logistic regression to investigate the rela-
tionship between WMA capacity and borehole func-
tionality or downtime as the outcome. We used a
logistical model that includes all of the independent
variables (i.e. the fourWMAdimensions and in a sepa-
rate model the 23 WMA questions) and a stepwise
approach to identify the optimummodel ﬁt.
We investigated the inﬂuence of ﬁve contextual
variables on WMA capacity (table 1). The ﬁve binary
variables were the independent variables in a linear
Figure 1.The ‘socio-technical interface’: the relationship between the local watermanagement arrangement and the community
borehole.
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regression model with WMA score as the dependant
variable. One of these variables is a factor from our
stratiﬁed sampling technique (whether the commu-
nity was poor or better off) and the remaining four
variables were identiﬁed from our literature review as
potentially important inﬂuencers of WMA capacity
(presence or absence of alternative sources (e.g. Kelly
et al 2018); India Mark II or Afridev handpump (e.g.
Foster et al 2018); whether the borehole is more or less
than 10 years old (e.g. Foster 2013); and population
(e.g. Cronk and Bartram 2017), deﬁned here as whe-
ther the borehole is serving more or less people than
the pump is designed to serve, based on a design capa-
city of 300 users).
Finally, we also conducted a logistic regression
examining the inﬂuence of the ﬁve independent vari-
ables outlined above, WMA score, climate (wet or
dry), and aquifer type (sedimentary or hard rock) on
functionality outcomes. Data for the variables were
collected from national government datasets, district
water ofﬁce records, and from ﬁeld and community
observations during the survey.
4. Results
4.1.Water governance arrangements
Figure 2(a) shows that the majority of WMAs in the
survey are at medium capacity (54.5%), with a near
similar number having either weak (17.8%) or high
(18.8%) capacity. A smaller number of sites (8.7%)
had non-existent WMAs. As ﬁgure 2(b) shows, when
total WMA scores are broken down into the four
WMA dimensions there is more variation than this
aggregate picture suggests. The strongest WMA
dimension is C (decisionmaking)with 76.15% of sites
at medium or high capacity. The weakest dimension is
B (affordable M&R) with 61.9% of sites weak or non-
existent.
Figure 2(c) shows a correlation matrix of the four
WMA dimensions as well as the inﬂuence of each of
these dimensions on borehole functionality, measured
as a binary fully functional/non-functional. The
strongest relationship (r=0.74) exists betweenWMA
dimension A (ﬁnance system) and C (decision mak-
ing) and the weakest relationship (r=0.05) between
B (affordable M&R) and D (external support). The
remaining pairings (WMA dimensions A–B, A–D,
B–C, and C–D) are all weakly correlated (see also SM
4). Figure 2(c) also shows that affordable M&R is most
closely correlated to borehole functionality, although
only weakly (r=0.28). External support has the
weakest correlation to functionality with a slightly
negative relationship (r=−0.09).
4.2.WMAand borehole functionality
The results of the logistic regression (table 3 in SM 4)
show that the four WMA dimensions are a poor
predictor of functionality (Cragg-Uhler pseudo
R2=0.14). However, affordable maintenance and
repair is the most important factor (p<0.001). After
performing a step-wise regression, ﬁnance system
drops out of the model, suggesting it has little or no
bearing on functionality. When all of the individual
questions are included in the logistic regression, the
model ﬁt improves (Cragg-Uhler pseudo R2=0.29).
Question B3 (affordability of spare parts) has a p-value
<0.01 and questions B2 (knowledge of the price of
spare parts) and B4 (availability of technical skills for
repair work) have a p-value<0.05.
Figures 3(a) and (b) show the relationship between
WMA capacity and borehole functionality. In
ﬁgure 3(a), as may be expectedWMA capacity is high-
est for fully functioning boreholes. The scores of the
two poor reliability categories (2 and 4) are similarly
matched whilst the low yield and non-functional
categories (3 and 5) have the lowest scores and are
also similarly matched, with WMA capacity for non-
functional boreholes lowest overall. One reading of
ﬁgure 3(a) is that unreliable boreholes pull WMA
capacity in opposing directions. On the one hand, an
unreliable borehole may undermine the community’s
capacity to manage. This is inferred by comparing
categories 1 and 2, which shows that WMA score is
lower for unreliable boreholes than fully functional
boreholes. On the other hand, comparing categories 2
and 4 suggests unreliable boreholes may also enhance
WMA capacity by forcing the community to develop
management experience in order to cope.
Figure 3(b) looks at the variationwithin each of the
fourWMA dimensions for the ﬁve borehole function-
ality categories.WithWMAdimensions A–C, capacity
is highest for fully functional boreholes. This differ-
ence is particularly notable for affordable M&R; a
ﬁnding that is supported by the stronger correlation
we observe between affordable M&R and borehole
functionality in ﬁgure 2(c). AffordableM&R is also the
most important factor in the logistic regression (sup-
plementary materials, table 4), and this is reﬂected in
ﬁgure 3(b). Thus, it appears that community ability to
access the skills and materials required to repair a
borehole has the strongest inﬂuence on borehole func-
tionality relative to the other fourWMAdimensions.
Figure 3(c) shows the relationship between WMA
capacity and borehole downtime over the previous
year, classed as <30 d, 30–100 d, and 100–365 d.
Dimensions A–Cbroadly follow the same inverse rela-
tionship with capacity decreasing as borehole down-
time increases. This suggests that ﬁnance system,
affordable M&R, and decision making all contribute
in a straightforward way to the speed at which a com-
munity repairs its borehole when it breaks down. This
trend does not carry over to dimension D (external
support). Here mean capacity for the 30–100 d down-
time category is clearly higher than the other two
downtime categories. This suggests that external sup-
port becomes most relevant when the borehole has a
more substantial fault that is not easilymanaged by the
5
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community (for example because it requires a part,
tools, or expertise not available to them). However, the
drop off in capacity for 100–365 d suggests that as the
borehole fault becomes too problematic external sup-
port wanes.
4.3. Inﬂuence of external factors onWMA
Table 1 shows the results of the linear regression
examining the inﬂuence of a range of external factors
onWMA capacity. The model shows a very weak ﬁt to
the data (R2<0.1). However, the factors that appear
to have the strongest inﬂuence (p0.05) are poverty
status, population (both of which appear to have a
negative relationship with WMA) and type of hand
pump (lowest p-value).
A second analysis, shown in table 2, was conducted
which examined the inﬂuence of the ﬁve external factors
shown in table 1, WMA score (good >= 50% or
bad<50%) and climate (wet or dry) and aquifer type
(sedimentary or hard rock) on functionality. The model
shows that the two most important inﬂuences on func-
tionality outputs are climate (p0.01 andnegative rela-
tionship with functionality) and aquifer type (p0.04).
The strength of the WMA arrangement is not strongly
related to functionality (p> 0.5). In the step-wisemodel
WMAdropsout of the input variables altogether.
5.Discussion
Our study suggests that across Ethiopia, Malawi, and
Uganda, the capacity of communities to manage their
boreholes is relatively good, with the majority of
WMAs are at medium capacity or higher. The strong
correlation (r=0.77) between WMA dimension A
(ﬁnance system) and D (decision making, rules, and
leadership) is expected given that ‘ﬁnance system’ is
not a measure of actual ﬁnances generated but the
arrangement in place for sourcing and managing
funds. This arrangement therefore depends upon the
decision making, rules, and leadership capacity of the
WMA. The lack of any real correlation (r=0.14)
between dimension B (affordable M&R) and D
(external support) is also what you may expect to ﬁnd
because when a community has the ﬁnances and
technical skills to undertake repairs they are less reliant
on external actors for support (WaterAid 2011). How-
ever, a key point of the study is that despite WMA
capacity being generally adequate we found only a
Figure 2. (a)Percentage of sites in eachWMAcapacity category. (b)Percentage of sites inWMAcapacity category broken down by the
fourWMAdimensions. (c)Correlationmatrix showing the relationship between the fourWMAdimensions and functionality (as a
binary outcome).
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weak relationship between WMA capacity and bore-
hole functionality. This highlights the complexity of
the sociotechnical interface (ﬁgure 1), where under-
standing it is a challenge given the difﬁculty of
identifying any clear relationships.
Of the four WMA dimensions, affordable M&R is
the best predictor of borehole functionality and is also
most strongly correlated to it. Within this dimension,
and across all 23 survey questions, questions B3
(affordability of spares), B2 (knowledge of the prices of
spares), and B4 (availability of technical skills) are the
best predictors of functionality. This ﬁts with the ﬁnd-
ings of other studies that testify to the importance of
ﬁnances and the availability of technical skills for
Figure 3. (a)WMAscore versus functionality categories as shown inﬁgure 1. (b)The fourWMAdimension scores versus borehole
functionality categories. The p-value for the functional category versus the remaining categories was<0.05, showing that there is a
signiﬁcant difference betweenWMAscore for functional and non-functional boreholes. Category B has the strongest relationship
with functionality. (c)The fourWMAdimension scores versus downtime. The p-value for<100 d versus>100 d downtimewas
<0.05 showing that there is a signiﬁcant difference betweenWMAscore for longer and shorter borehole downtimes.
7
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delivering on the policy of CBM (Whittington et al
2009, Carter et al 2010, Practica Foundation 2013,
Adank et al 2014, Bey et al 2014, Chowns 2015). At the
same time, we found affordable M&R to have the low-
est capacity of all four WMA dimensions, with 61.9%
of sites weak or non-existent. This suggests that in
terms of achieving borehole functionality, manage-
ment capacity is lowwhere it counts themost.
The weak nature of the link between WMA capa-
city and borehole functionality that our study high-
lights means it is difﬁcult to assess the efﬁcacy of CBM
policy. That this relationship is not stronger could be
partly attributed to a counteracting inverse relation-
ship in some cases. Poorly functioning boreholes may
forceWMAs to function better in order to secure even
basic supplies of water. Our literature review failed to
identify any studies that shed light on this dynamic,
which we therefore highlight as an important area for
future research.
The poor ﬁt (R2<0.1) of our model examining
the inﬂuence of contextual variables onWMAcapacity
again suggests the difﬁculty of identifying clear factors
to understand the performance of CBM. However, of
the variables we examined, HP type (P<0.01), pov-
erty (P<0.01), and population (P<0.05) had the
strongest inﬂuences on WMA capacity. In particular,
it appears that hand pumps designed to bemaintained
by communities (VLOM type pumps such as the
Afridev and India Mark III) are more likely to be asso-
ciated with functioning WMA arrangements. Our
analysis (table 2) also suggests that physical factors
(aquifer type and climate) have stronger inﬂuences on
functionality than the relative strengthens or weak-
nesses of the associated WMAs. All models suggest a
weak relationship between functionality andWMAs.
Overall, our ﬁndings provide very limited evidence
to support the policy of CBM for borehole manage-
ment. Couple this with the complexity of assessing
functionality at the sociotechnical interface and a key
question emerges: how dowe explain the persistence of
CBM as a model for rural water supply in SSA? This
question is pertinent given that between 15% and 60%
of waterpoints are estimated to be non-functional at
any one time (Banks and Furey 2016; RWSN 2010,
Harvey andReed 2007, Lockwood and Smits 2011, Fos-
ter et al 2019). In section 2, we outlined the political his-
tory of CBM in relation to rural groundwater supply.
This analysis revealed a hybrid ideological under-
pinning that has made CBM a compelling model,
relieving governments and donors of responsibility for
ongoing operation and maintenance whilst continuing
to assert the empowerment of communities (Colin
1999, Blaikie 2006, van den Broek and Brown 2015,
Whaley and Cleaver 2017). We therefore suggest, along
with other critical literature (Mosse 1999, Cornwall and
Brock 2005, Blaikie 2006), that the ongoing popularity
of CBM is shaped as much by this ideological under-
current as by empirical evidence of effectiveness.
6. Conclusion
Wehave set out to answer the question, does increased
understanding of the relationship between water
management capacity and borehole functionality lend
support to the policy of CBM for sustainable ground-
water supply? Our results provide very limited evi-
dence to support the policy of CBM whilst also
revealing the nuanced and complex nature of the
sociotechnical interface. The difﬁculty of deriving
clear relationships from the interacting social and
physical dimensions of rural water supply serves as a
cautionary note to research that adopts overly simplis-
tic and reductive approaches to understanding com-
munity borehole functionality.
In concluding, our study suggests that evidence
alone has not accounted for the persistence of CBM in
SSA. Challenging the more standard evidence-policy-
practice framing, we have argued instead that in the
case of CBM evidence and policy are intimately bound
up with ideology and the political-economic context
in which it has emerged. It is only by considering this
evidence-ideology-policy nexus that we can better
account for the ongoing popularity of CBM.We argue
that it is this same nexus that will likely ensure its
popularity for some time to come, despite new ideas
and evidence to the contrary.
Table 1.Results of the linear regression showing the inﬂuence of
external factors onWMAoutcomes.Model 1 includes all factors.
Model 2 is the result of the step-wise linear regression.N is the
number of sites used in themodel and themodelﬁt is also
shown (R2).
Model 1 Model 2
Coefﬁcient p-value Coefﬁcient p-value
Alternative
sources
−1.17 0.59
No=1
Yes=0
HP type 6.71 *** 0.00 6.53 *** 0.00
Afridev
or IM3=1
IM2=0
WP age 0.48 0.71
<10 years=1
>10 years=0
Poverty −2.81 * 0.03 −3.12 * 0.01
Better off=1
Poor=0
Population −2.71 * 0.03 −2.82 * 0.02
HP
serves
<300=1
HP
serves
>300=0
N 469 469
R2 0.08 0.08
Note.*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05.
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